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Abstract 
 
The paper examines the influence of investor protection on international equity portfolio 
investments. Using bilateral portfolio holdings data for 36 countries for 2001-2006, the study 
demonstrates that the investor protection measures are important determinants of foreign 
equity portfolio investments. The findings suggest that by improving the quality and 
enforcement efficiency of legal protections offered to foreign investors, policymakers may be 
able to attract greater international equity portfolio investments.  
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Investor protection and International Equity Portfolio Investments  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Investor protection has been considered as one of the key factors in explaining the cross 
sectional differences in the development of capital markets and the ability of corporations to 
raise external finance. La Porta et al. (1997) hereinafter referred to as LLSV (1997) suggest 
that markets where contracts are enforced and creditors are protected demonstrate superior 
operation of debt and equity markets. They argue that since quality of legal rules and their 
enforcement greatly differ across countries, varying levels of legal protection can explain 
why firms in some countries raise more funds than in others. Indeed, compared to domestic 
investors, foreign investors are more vulnerable to the risks of expropriation and hence their 
decision to invest is significantly influenced by the levels of investor protection. As a direct 
consequence, foreign investors are willing to invest more in countries where they have 
greater confidence in the legal institutions.1  
 
 
Foreign investors, often being minority shareholders, are concerned about how well their 
interests are protected from expropriation by controlling shareholders and managers. La Porta 
et al., (2000) suggest that expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders 
and managers includes direct theft of profit or selling of outputs, assets or securities to other 
firms at a significantly cheaper price for private benefits of insiders. In other circumstances, 
expropriation involves diversion of corporate opportunities from the firm by employing 
unqualified family members in managerial positions, or overpaying executives. Johnson et al. 
(2000) find that lack of effective corporate governance due to weak legal institutions was 
partly responsible for the significant losses to foreign investors following the sharp 
                                                 
1 Jensen and Heckling (1976) suggest that where legal rights are extensive and well enforced by regulators or 
courts, investors are more willing to finance firms.  
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depreciation of the currency during the Asian crisis in 1997-98. Further, Dialog (1999) 
demonstrates the vulnerability of foreign investors to expropriation during 1997-98 Asian 
crises using Korean example where minority shareholders of large firms, that included global 
companies such as Samsung Electronics, objected to the transfer of cash resources. These 
transfers were mainly targeted to support other loss making subsidiaries and pay off personal 
debts.  
 
Previous literature has shown that important features of capital markets can be explained by 
differences in legal protection available to investors. LLSV (1997) show that better protection 
of shareholders is associated with higher number of listed stocks, whilst Eleswarapu and 
Venkataraman (2006) find that better investor protections are associated with larger turnover 
and liquidity. Others have reported that a strong legal framework for investor protection leads 
to: higher firm valuation relative to their book value (Claessens et al., 2002), higher dividend 
payouts (La Porta et al., 2000), widespread control of ownership (La Porta et al., 1999) and 
reduced managerial private benefits (Zingales, 1994 and Nenova, 1999). It therefore follows 
that if the quality of investor protection has a positive influence on the development of stocks 
markets, it should in turn also influence the extent of foreign equity portfolio investments. 
Thus, the quality and credibility of investor protection measures may help, in part, in 
explaining why developing countries attract less portfolio investments despite higher 
economic growth and superior equity returns.  
 
One of the reasons for lower portfolio investments in developing countries is attributed to the 
existence of several formal and informal barriers which deter foreign investors from 
investing. Bekaert (1995) suggests that in many developing countries, foreign investors are 
prevented from owning majority shares and in some countries; higher taxes are levied on 
profits earned from investment activities. Indirect barriers arise from differences in 
availability of information, accounting standards, and quality of investor protection and 
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enforcement (see Errunza, 2001; Bekaert et al, 2003 and Hunter, 2005). Although Bekaert 
and Harvey (2000) and Bekaert et al., (2002) have done significant work in demonstrating 
how different investment barriers affect cost of capital, market volatility and asset pricing, 
they do not provide direct evidence on how the legal system, quality of legal institutions and 
foreign investor specific protection measures affect the level of foreign equity portfolio 
investments.   
 
This paper aims to bridge the gap in the existing literature by providing direct evidence on the 
relationship between the quality of investor protection regulations and international equity 
portfolio investments. Using the bilateral equity portfolio holdings data for 36 developed and 
developing countries and after controlling for a host of confounding variables, we find that 
investor protection rights, particularly those that directly affect foreign investors, have a 
positive and statistically significant impact on international equity portfolio investments. Our 
findings are consistent with those reported earlier that external shareholders prefer to invest 
in markets that have better investor protection rights to safeguard the interest of foreign 
investors. The findings provided in the paper offers useful insights to the policy makers 
particularly in developing countries since it is evident that by improving the quality and 
enforcement efficiency of legal protections offered to foreign investors, greater levels of 
foreign equity portfolio investments could be attracted.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The following section describes the data used in 
this study. Section 3 explains the empirical procedure and discusses the results. The final 
section of the paper provides the main conclusions. 
 
2. Data 
 
This study mainly focuses on two sets of data. First comprise bilateral international equity 
portfolio holdings on county by country basis. The second consists of three different variables 
capturing various forms of investor protection measures. Both data sets are explained below. 
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2.1   Data on bilateral international equity portfolio holdings 
 
In October 1997 the IMF undertook a survey, Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey 
(CPIS), whereby 29 participating countries began to report their portfolio investment 
positions on a bilateral basis. The survey is conducted annually since 2001 with an aim to 
have better understanding of the global asymmetries in the reported balance of payment data, 
particularly those related to the portfolio investments. All participating countries are required 
to report a breakdown of their portfolio holdings by the country of residency of the 
nonresident issuer. The coverage includes the primary end-investors (e.g. banks, security 
dealers, pension funds, insurance companies, mutual funds, non financial corporations, and 
households) and primary custodians, who hold or manage securities on behalf of others.2 The 
data are downloadable from the IMF’s website. In order to ensure balanced panel for efficient 
estimation, we have not included data from 1997 since data for all countries included in our 
sample were not consistently available until 2001. Consequently, we have had to restrict our 
sample period to 2001-2006. Further since most of the portfolio investments are from 
developed countries and investments from the developing countries are negligible, we have 
considered only developed countries as investor countries. A list of investor and recipient 
countries included in the study are shown in Column 1 of Table 1.  
 
The dependent variable is the logarithmic value of the equity portfolio allocation (weights) 
from country i into country j and is defined as; 
 
                                                 
2
 However, some caveats deserve due attention. Any investment below USD 500,000 is not reported. Also, some data despite being available may not be reported by a 
country due to confidentiality reasons.   Also, consistent with other studies, we have not included the smaller off-shore financial centres such as Luxembourg and Ireland as 
target markets.  
         (
      
∑       
  
   
) (1)  
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where wijt is the weight of foreign holdings from country i into country j for the year t and 
FPIijt is the actual foreign portfolio holdings in USD million.  
 
2.2 Investor Protection Measures 
 
Unlike previous studies, two of the three investor protection measures that we use in this 
study are time varying. These two measures are derived from The Political Risk Services 
Group’s International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The ICRG provides monthly ratings for 
political, economic and financial risks for a large number of countries by assigning ratings to 
each component and sub-component pertaining to each of the three types of risk. The highest 
number of points indicates lowest potential risk whilst lowest point (0) indicates highest 
potential risk. The maximum point assigned to a particular component is preset within the 
system depending on the importance (weighting) of that component to the overall risk for the 
country. ICRG collects information related to economic, financial and political risks and 
assesses them for assigning risk points for each individual risk component. The political 
ratings are solely based on subjective analysis of the collected political information whereas 
economic and financial risk components’ ratings are based on objective assessments. 
 
Two of the three investor protection measures used in this study are from the sub-components 
of overall political risk ratings as shown in the Table A1 of appendix. The purpose of the 
political risk rating is to provide a common platform for assessing the political stability of the 
countries covered by ICRG on a relative basis. The risk rating comprises 12 components 
rated on the basis of pre-set questions for each component. The annual average of the 
monthly ratings is used in this study.  The third measure is a dummy variable used by La 
Porta et al., (1998) which shows that English common law system provides better legal 
protection to shareholders compared to the German and French civil law systems. We use a 
legal dummy which takes the value of 1 for common law countries and 0 otherwise.  Detailed 
description of each investor protection measure is provided in the following section. 
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2.2.1. Investor Protection I (Investment Profile)  
 
Out of the 12 sub-components of ICRG’s political risk rating, three components are used as 
measures of investor protection (investment profile) reflecting government’s attitude toward 
inward investment (see Bekaert et al., 2007). The rating of the investment profile is 
determined by PRS’s assessment of three sub-components: (i) contract viability or risk of 
expropriation (ii) payment delays; and (iii) repatriation of profits. As shown in Panel B of 
Appendix A1, each subcomponent is scored on a scale with zero indicating high risk and four 
suggesting very low risk. Increase in this rating indicates improvement in the policies, rules 
and enforcement of regulations related to foreign investments. 
 
2.2.2  Investor Protection II (Quality of Institutions) 
 
Investor protection comprises three sub-components of ICRG’s political risk rating 
components: (i) corruption (ii) law and order and (iii) Bureaucratic Quality (see LLSV, 1998 
and Bekaert et al, 2007). ICRG considers that corruption poses a threat to foreign investments 
because it distorts the economic and financial environment, affects the efficiency of 
government and business, encourages placement of incumbents on the basis of political 
connection rather than ability, and finally it creates inherent instability in the political system 
owing to unhealthy competition for power by corrupt authorities. The most common form of 
such type of risk related to foreign investments is the financial corruption, such as demand for 
payments and bribes related to official work, exchange control, tax assessments etc. Such 
corrupt practices negatively affect the confidence of foreign investors.  
 
ICRG assesses law and order separately. Each component of law and order is assigned 
maximum of three points. The subcomponent law is an assessment of the strength and 
impartiality of the legal system. The order subcomponent is an assessment of popular 
observance of the law. For example, a country may score high (3) rating for quality of law in 
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terms of its judicial system but may score very low (0) if the law is ignored without being 
sanctioned effectively. ICRG (2008) claims that the strength and quality of bureaucracy acts 
as a shock absorber which tends to minimize the risk of policy instability when government 
changes. As such, ICRG assigns high points (maximum of 6) to countries where the quality 
of bureaucracy is strong and efficient enough to govern without drastic changes in the policy 
or interruptions in government services. In low risk countries, the quality of bureaucracy is 
somewhat autonomous from high degree of political influence and exhibits well established 
mechanism of recruitment and training. Countries scoring poorly may lack the cushioning 
effect because a change in government tends to be traumatic for policy formulation and other 
administrative functions.  
 
2.2.3.  Investor Protection III (Common English Law) 
 
Our third variable used as a proxy of investor protection is borrowed from La Porta et al. 
(1998) who have shown that English common law system provides better legal protection 
rights to shareholders, while German and French civil law system the least. We use a Legal 
Dummy which takes the value of 1 for common law countries and 0 for others. 
 
2.3. Additional Control Variables 
 
Extant literature has shown that investors do not allocate investments according to the 
theoretical assumptions of ICAPM and tend to significantly overweight their home markets 
causing the actual portfolio weights to deviate from the global market portfolio as assumed in 
the ICAPM (see French and Poterba 1991; Tesar and Werner, 1995; Warnock, 2001 Karlsson 
and Norden, 2007 among others). Following Fidora et al., (2007) we construct the following 
bilateral home bias (Hbiasijt) measure that would control for the home bias:   
 
                                    (2) 
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where Hbiasijt is bilateral home bias for investor country i for country j at time t.  BWTijt is 
defined as the benchmark weight and is computed as  
 
             (∑     
  
    )         (3) 
 
where MCjt is the market capitalization of the issuer country j at time t.   
 
Although the use of home bias proxy as a control variable as warranted by the existing 
literature, the measure, by construction, includes the bilateral international equity portfolio 
allocation and may therefore affect the regression results. We address this by adding an 
interactive term of home bias and each of the investor protection measure3. 
 
In addition to the home bias measure and the interactive term, we include several other 
control variables that may influence foreign portfolio investments. First, equity market 
development/size has been shown to affect the investment decisions of foreign investors.  
Chan et al. (2005) suggest that foreign investors tend to allocate more funds in markets which 
are bigger and relatively more developed. We include logarithmic ratio of stock market 
capitalization to GDP as a measure of stock market development and size. We obtain this 
measure from World Bank Indicator (WDI).  Second, we use the turnover ratio as a proxy for 
measuring trading liquidity and transaction costs (see Gelos and Wei, 2005). Third, we use 
yearly cross sectional standard deviation of the monthly equity returns for each country to 
capture potential uncertainty of future returns. It has been shown that foreign investors avoid 
investing in markets that exhibit high historical volatility and thus we expect that coefficient 
for this variable should carry a negative sign. Fourth, foreign portfolio investments are 
                                                 
3 
We the referee for correcting the specification issue. 
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influenced by long term bilateral relationship, geographic proximity and market familiarity. 
We use a common language dummy which takes the value of one if the pair country shares a 
common language. We also include the logarithmic distance (in kilometers) between the 
capital cities of the pair countries to capture geographic proximity. Both variables are 
obtained from www.nber.org/~wei/data.html and have been previously used by Subramanian 
and Wei (2006). Further, bilateral trade agreements have been shown to play an important 
role in attracting cross border foreign investments (Chan et al., 2005). Thus, we use bilateral 
trade variable by calculating the total export and import for each pair country. The data is 
obtained from Bilateral Trade Statistics of IMF. Fifth, the tendency of foreign investors to 
invest in countries with higher historical returns is commonly referred to as ‘return chasing’ 
or ‘feedback’ hypothesis (see Bohn and Tesar, 1996 for US markets Griffin et al, 2004 for 
emerging markets). We calculate three year moving average of historical returns (based on 
monthly total return index of MSCI) and include this in our model to capture the possible 
effects of the return chasing hypothesis. We expect the regression coefficient on this variable 
to bear a positive sign.  
 
We also include two broad country risk measures obtained from the Political Risk Group. 
First is ‘financial risk’ that is based on a scale of 0-50 for five financial components (foreign 
debt as % of GDP, exchange rate stability, foreign debt as % of total export and services, 
current account as % of exports and services and international liquidity). The second is 
‘economic risk’ that is also measured on a scale of 0-50 points and which includes five 
components (GDP per head, Real GDP growth, inflation rate, budget balance as % of GDP, 
current account as % of GDP). Finally, we also include a capital control measure index 
constructed by Chin and Ito (2008). The index is publicly available and can be downloaded 
from http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~mchinn/research.html. The index is based on four major 
restrictions on external accounts namely, presence of multiple exchange rates, restrictions on 
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current account transactions, restriction on capital account transactions and requirements 
regarding surrender of export proceeds. The index has a mean value of zero and takes higher 
values for more open economies. For example, for 2006 in our sample, China, India and 
Turkey have strong capital controls and thus the index measure is -1.13 while open 
economies such as the UK and the USA carry an index value of 2.54.    
 
3. Empirical Findings  
 
We present the empirical finding of our analysis based on both simple descriptive statistics 
and more rigorous panel data regressions. We first discuss the result of descriptive statistics 
followed by the findings of regression analysis. 
 
3.1 Descriptive and Rank Statistics 
 
Column 2 of Table 1 shows average foreign portfolio allocation received by different 
countries over the period of six years (2001-2006). The third and fourth columns show 
average rating of each country in terms of Investor Protection Indicators, IPI and IPII. The 
fifth column shows the composite rating based on scores for IPI and IPII and the final column 
reports the dummy for the legal system followed by countries. Overall, countries have been 
ranked on the basis of composite investor protection index (IPI+IPII).  
 
All of the top fifteen countries in terms of investor protection ratings are developed countries 
which also receive almost 86% of the total foreign equity portfolio investments. The bottom 
fifteen countries are all developing countries with the possible exception of Greece and these 
countries receive approximately 5% of the total international portfolio allocation. Notably, 
countries that use the Common English Law receive around 58% of the total international 
portfolio investments. We also conduct the statistical test of spearman rank correlation to 
confirm the potential relationship. The rho value of the Spearman tests between international 
equity portfolio allocation and the three measures of investor protection, i.e. IPI, IPII and IPII 
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are 0.47, 0.27 and 0.19 respectively. In all three cases, we reject the null of no independence 
at statistical significance level of 5% and 1%4. The findings show that countries receiving 
higher international portfolio allocation also rank high on the composite investor protection 
index providing an early indication of a positive relationship between better investor 
protection and higher international portfolio investments.  
 
…………Insert Table 1 here…………. 
 
3.2 Regression Results 
 
We use data for 36 countries (destination countries) with bilateral equity portfolio allocation 
from investors of 16 developed counties (investor countries) for a period of six years.  We 
utilize a panel data framework and employ fixed effect model to mitigate any potential 
endogeneity arising from unit specific effect. Thus where we use IPI and IPII which are time 
varying measures, we estimate the regressions using fixed effect model5. However, the third 
investor protection measure (IPIII) is a time invariant variable and hence we use the random 
effect model. The test-statistics are based on robust standard errors given the possibility of 
country specific clustering in our data. 
 
Since our empirical approach is aimed at examining whether investor protection measures 
have any significant impact on international equity portfolio allocations, we run the following 
base model that controls for the home bias with an interactive term: 
 
                                                 
4
 We thank the anonymous referee for suggesting the statistical test. 
5
 Our fixed effect estimation could be inefficient due to serial correlation in the error. We use Prais-Winsten regression with country dummies that allows for country 
specific effects for addressing heteroskedasticity using robust standard error. Our results are similar to the ones reported but do not report these for saving space. However, 
the results are available on request. 
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The coefficient for investor protection variable is expected to be positive since international 
investors prefer countries with better investor protection rights. The regression results are 
presented in Table 2. As expected, the coefficients for investor protection measures are 
positive and statistically significant at 5% level. The coefficients for home bias are negative 
and highly significant confirming the widely reported phenomenon of home bias in 
international portfolio allocation decisions. The results suggest that after controlling for home 
bias, different levels of investor protection measures do significantly influence foreign equity 
portfolio investments. The statistical significance and the negative sign of interactive term 
suggest that improvement in investor protection framework becomes less effective in 
attracting foreign equity portfolio investment if investors' exhibit extensive home bias for the 
respective country. However, results presented in Table 2 may not be entirely reliable since 
foreign portfolio allocations may be influenced by a variety of other factors discussed in 
section 2.3. In the following sections, we run regressions using different specifications which 
incorporate various control variables. 
 
…………Insert Table 2 here…………. 
 
 
3.2.1 Omitted variables bias 
The first issue we deal with relates to the omitted variable bias. Our regression coefficients 
estimated in specification (1) may be biased in the absence of the various control variables. 
Thus in regression specification (2), we include control variables, including home bias and 
the interactive term, while accounting for individual country and time effects by including 
country and time dummies.  
 
The results reported in Table 3 show that size of the coefficients for Hbias and investor 
protection measures is lower than those estimated via specification 1. The inclusion of the 
                                                                                     
 
 
(2)  
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control variables and country and time dummies seem to account for the possible omitted 
variable bias in specification 1. However, coefficients for investor protection measures 
remain positive and statistically significant. 
 
…………Insert Table 3 here…………. 
 
3.2.2 Reverse Causality 
Endogeneity arising from reverse causality could be another potential problem in our 
estimations since growth in international equity portfolio investment may in turn improve the 
regulatory environment of the recipient country (see Errunza, 2001). We address this issue by 
using one year lagged value of investor protection measure6 and estimate specification (3).  
 
 
Results reported in Table 4 suggest that while the coefficient for IPI is positive and 
statistically significant, coefficient for IPII is not significant anymore. This may suggest that 
foreign investors may be more concerned with investor protection measures that directly 
affect their investment interests which are proxied by IPI. The findings are consistent with 
Bekaert et al. (2007), who also find that foreign investors are more concerned about those 
aspects of legal and regulatory environment, which directly affect them rather than overall 
quality of institutions captured by IPII in our analysis. 
 
…………Insert Table 4 here…………. 
 
 
                                                 
6
 The use of lagged values of the indices also addresses the possibility of the investors acting on the basis of expected investor protection measures. We do not include the 
IPIII in specification 3 because it is a time invariant dummy variable. 
                                                                                         
 
 
 
(3)  
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Furthermore, following Gelos and Wei (2005) we run the vector autoregression between the 
international portfolio allocation and investor protection measures using following 
specification:  
 
As reported in Table 5, IPI granger causes foreign equity portfolio allocation but IPII does 
not. Similarly, international equity portfolio allocations do not granger cause both, the IPI and 
IPII. The vector autorgression results confirm the significance of IPI7. 
 
…………Insert Table 5 here…………. 
 
3.2.3 Major Financial Centers 
 
Next, we consider the possibility that international investors may choose to buy foreign 
stocks in major financial centers instead of directly investing in foreign equity markets. 
International investors may be tempted to use major financial centers, such as USA, UK and 
Japan, to directly buy the cross-listed stocks and/or depository receipts because they may 
perceive that their investor protection rights are better protected by regulations in major 
financial centers (Reese and Weisbach, 2002). In order to accommodate this possibility, we 
exclude USA, UK and Japan from our sample and run the following specification:  
 
                                                 
7
 The between effect estimations, which discard the time series information, also yield similar results with IPI and IPII being statistically 
significant and not IPII. 
                                                                                            
 
 
(4)  
 
                                                                                      
 
 
(5)  
                                                                                     
 
 
(6)  
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Results reported in Table 6 show that despite excluding major financial centers, all three 
investor protection measures remain positive and statistically significant thus confirming that 
investor protection remains an overwhelmingly top consideration for foreign investors.  
 
…………Insert Table 6 here…………. 
 
 
3.2.4  Other control variables 
 
Estimated coefficients for most of the control variables carry the expected sign and statistical 
significance except for the coefficients of historical returns and capital controls, which are 
either not significant or change sign in different regression specifications. However, 
consistent with previous studies, we too find that among other control variables, equity 
market development is one of the most significant factors followed by liquidity/transaction 
cost, equity market volatility and bilateral familiarity variables (see Gelos and Wei, 2005 and 
Chan et al., 2005). The findings seem to suggest that that investors prefer to invest in 
markets, which have adequate depth; breadth and exhibit lower market volatility. The 
statistical significance of investor protection measures, particularly IPI and IPII, appear to 
feature consistently in most regression specifications. This implies that by strengthening the 
protections frameworks offered to foreign investors, greater foreign portfolio investments 
could be attracted.   
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Factors influencing international portfolio allocation decisions have significant theoretical 
and practical relevance for academic research and policy makers. This paper examines the 
influence of investor protection on the behavior of bilateral international equity portfolio 
investments. By using two different stands of the literature, one that deals with investor 
protection and capital market development and the other that is concerned with the impact of 
investment barriers on foreign portfolio investments, this study provides evidence that 
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international investors prefer to invest in markets that have better investor protection 
measures in place. The findings suggest that measures specific to protecting the rights of 
foreign investors seem to matter most. Also, countries which use common English law appear 
to attract higher level international equity portfolio investments. Further, though investor 
protection reflected via the quality of institutions (IPII) is found statistically significant in 
most specifications; it does not seem to rank as highly and consistently as the regulations 
which directly protect the rights of foreign investors. 
 
The findings suggest that the quality and enforcement efficiency of legal protections accorded 
to foreign investors should be an important policy matter for attracting higher level of foreign 
equity portfolio investments. Our findings confirm that investor protection measures, 
particularly specific to foreign investments, are an important cross sectional determinant of 
international equity portfolio investments. The evidence provided in this paper extends and 
enriches the previous literature and confirms that foreign investors prefer investing in markets 
that have stronger foreign investor protection rights.  
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AppendixA1: Decomposition of ICRG’s Political Risk Components 
 
Panel A: Overall Political Risk Components 
Sequence Component Points (Max) 
   
A Government Stability 12 
B Socioeconomic Condition 12 
C Investment Profile 12 
D Internal Conflict 12 
E External Conflict 12 
F Corruption 6 
G Military in Politics 6 
H Religious Tension 6 
I Law and Order 6 
J Ethnic Tensions 6 
K Democratic Accountability 6 
L Bureaucracy Quality 4 
      
TOTAL   100 
   
 
Panel B: Investment Profile: Investor Protection Measures Specific to Foreign Investment 
Sequence Sub-Component Points (Max) 
   
C Contract Viability/Expropriation 4 
C Profit Repatriation 4 
C Payment Delays 4 
   
TOTAL   12 
   
 
Panel C: General Investor Protection Measure 
Sequence Components Points (Max) 
   
F Corruption 6 
I Law and Order 6 
L Bureaucracy Quality 4 
   
TOTAL   16 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics: Sample averages for 2001-2006 
Country 
Portfolio 
Allocation (%) 
IPI  
(0-12) 
IPII  
(0-16) 
Composite 
(IPI + IPII) 
Common 
English 
Law (IPIII) 
Finland 2.10 12.00 16.00 28.00 0 
Sweden 2.09 12.00 15.25 27.25 0 
New Zealand 0.15 11.83 15.33 27.17 1 
Denmark 0.56 11.61 15.50 27.11 0 
Austria 0.45 12.00 15.00 27.00 0 
Canada 1.71 12.00 14.68 26.68 1 
Norway 0.57 11.58 15.00 26.58 0 
UK 15.73 12.00 14.17 26.17 1 
Australia 1.46 11.33 14.50 25.83 1 
Germany 8.82 12.00 13.50 25.50 0 
Switzerland 5.33 11.75 13.50 25.25 0 
USA 37.76 11.67 13.58 25.25 1 
Belgium 1.08 11.61 12.92 24.54 0 
Japan 7.94 11.67 12.50 24.17 0 
Portugal 0.27 11.91 11.67 23.58 0 
France 10.81 12.00 11.00 23.00 0 
Chile 0.04 11.07 11.67 22.74 0 
Hungary 0.20 11.74 10.59 22.33 0 
Czech 0.09 11.63 10.59 22.22 0 
Taiwan 0.58 11.53 10.41 21.94 0 
Italy 3.43 11.92 9.00 20.92 0 
Poland 0.17 11.07 9.34 20.41 0 
Greece 0.28 10.67 9.08 19.75 0 
Mexico 0.42 11.17 7.49 18.66 0 
Malaysia 0.15 8.75 8.92 17.67 1 
India 0.31 8.57 8.99 17.56 1 
Turkey 0.19 7.84 8.66 16.50 0 
Philippines 0.04 9.42 6.99 16.42 0 
Korea 1.07 9.65 6.00 15.65 0 
Thailand 0.18 8.59 7.03 15.62 1 
Peru 0.02 8.00 7.33 15.33 0 
China 0.41 7.29 7.99 15.28 0 
Russia 0.58 8.83 6.40 15.23 0 
Brazil 0.54 7.75 6.67 14.42 0 
Argentina 0.05 6.05 7.98 14.03 0 
Indonesia 1.01 6.51 5.75 12.26 0 
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Table 2: Base Regression 
The dependent variable is the log value of country wise bilateral foreign portfolio allocation from country i in 
country j at time t (wi,j,t). The key independent variables of interest are investor profile (IPI), quality of 
institution (IPII) and English common law dummy (IPII). The only controls are bilateral home bias (Hbias) and 
interactive term (Hbias_IP). 
 
                                                                 
 
Regressions with IPI and IPII as independent variables are estimated using fixed effect model and with IPIII 
(Common English law dummy) using random effect model. Test-statistics are given in parentheses (based on 
robust standard error allowing for clustering within the cross sectional units). All the coefficients are interpreted 
as elasticity. Significant coefficients are indicated with * denoting significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1% 
significance level. 
 
 IPI IPII IPII 
Hbias -0.836*** -0.826*** -0.817*** 
 (-19.72) (-19.97) (-58.58) 
    
Investor protection 14.81*** 17.63*** 1.208*** 
 (13.11) (12.26) (6.19) 
    
Hbias_Investor protection -1.217*** -1.090*** -0.143* 
 (-2.90) (-2.69) (-1.85) 
    
Overall R
2
 0.38 0.43 0.35 
Number of observations 3288 3288 3288 
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Table 3: Regression with investor protection and all controls 
The dependent variable (wi,j,t). is the log value of country wise bilateral foreign portfolio allocation from country 
i in country j at time t. The key independent variables of interest are investor protection measures which 
includes investor profile (IPI), quality of institution (IPII) and English common law dummy (IPII). The controls 
are bilateral home bias,  (Hbias), Hbias_IP, stock market development/size, liquidity/transaction cost, equity 
market volatility, bilateral trade, common (pair countries) language dummy (pair countries), log distance 
between capital cities of the pair countries, three year moving average historical return, country financial risk 
(components are: foreign debt as % of GDP, exchange rate stability, foreign debt as % of total export and 
services, current account as % of exports and services and international liquidity), country economic risk 
(components are: GDP per head, Real GDP growth, inflation rate, budget balance as % of GDP, current account 
as % of GDP) and capital control. 
 
                                                  
 
Regressions with IPI and IPII as independent variables are estimated using fixed effect model and with IPIII 
(Common English law dummy) using random effect model. Test-statistics are given in parentheses (based on 
robust standard error allowing for clustering within the cross sectional units). All the coefficients are interpreted 
as elasticity. Significant coefficients are indicated with * denoting significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1% 
significance level. 
 IPI IPII IPIII 
Hbias -0.783*** -0.846*** -0.800*** 
 (-17.48) (-28.71) (-75.17) 
    
Investor protection 4.241*** 7.529*** 0.899*** 
 (4.20) (7.53) (7.07) 
    
Hbias_Investor protection -1.497*** -0.744*** -0.0464** 
 (-3.47) (-2.72) (-2.23) 
    
Stock market development/size 0.633*** 0.627*** 0.647*** 
 (22.51) (24.12) (22.12) 
    
Transaction cost 10.01*** 10.39*** 15.01*** 
 (5.47) (6.07) (7.72) 
    
Equity market volatility -0.133*** -0.125*** -0.128*** 
 (-6.58) (-5.99) (-6.36) 
    
Common language NA NA 0.339*** 
   (3.03) 
    
Bilateral trade 0.784*** 0.650*** 1.457*** 
 (4.73) (4.06) (8.72) 
    
Distance NA NA -0.213*** 
   (-4.80) 
    
Historical return 0.0154 0.0294 -0.0655** 
 (0.51) (1.05) (-2.24) 
    
Country financial risk 1.326*** 1.544*** 1.175*** 
 (8.76) (10.35) (7.62) 
    
Country economic risk 0.664*** 0.490** 0.704*** 
 (2.91) (2.19) (2.65) 
    
Capital market openness 0.0558 -1.932 4.211** 
 (0.03) (-0.88) (2.11) 
    
Overall R
2
 0.61 0.61 0.66 
Number of observations 3194 3194 3194 
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Table 4: Regression with lagged investor protection and all controls 
The dependent variable (wi,j,t). is the log value of country wise bilateral foreign portfolio allocation from country 
i in country j at time t. The key independent variables of interest are one year lagged value of investor protection 
measures which includes investor profile (IPI) and quality of institution (IPII). The controls are bilateral home 
bias (Hbias), Hbias_IP, stock market development/size, liquidity/transaction cost, equity market volatility, 
bilateral trade, common (pair countries) language dummy (pair countries), log distance between capital cities of 
the pair countries, three year moving average historical return, country financial risk (components are: foreign 
debt as % of GDP, exchange rate stability, foreign debt as % of total export and services, current account as % 
of exports and services and international liquidity), country economic risk (components are: GDP per head, Real 
GDP growth, inflation rate, budget balance as % of GDP, current account as % of GDP) and capital control. 
 
                                                    
 
Regressions with IPI and IPII as independent variables are estimated using fixed effect model. Test-statistics are 
given in parentheses (based on robust standard error allowing for clustering within the cross sectional units). All 
the coefficients are interpreted as elasticity. Significant coefficients are indicated with * denoting significance at 
10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1% significance level. 
 
 IPI IPII 
Hbias -0.840*** -0.926*** 
 (-19.83) (-31.52) 
   
Lagged Investor protection 3.747*** 0.111 
 (5.09) (0.15) 
   
Hbias_Investor protection -1.185*** -0.207 
 (-2.93) (-0.76) 
   
Stock market development/size 0.473*** 0.489*** 
 (17.67) (19.61) 
   
Transaction cost 11.46*** 10.38*** 
 (5.57) (5.26) 
   
Equity market volatility -0.102*** -0.113*** 
 (-5.82) (-6.09) 
   
Common language NA NA 
   
Bilateral trade 0.951*** 1.025*** 
 (6.07) (6.17) 
   
Distance NA NA 
   
   
Historical return 0.0432* 0.0320 
 (1.73) (1.34) 
   
Country financial risk 0.817*** 1.011*** 
 (4.66) (5.87) 
   
Country economic risk 1.367*** 1.107*** 
 (5.33) (4.47) 
   
Capital market openness 4.261 3.330 
 (1.55) (1.20) 
   
Overall R
2
 0.568 0.558 
Number of observations 2616 2616 
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Table 5: Vector autoregression 
Vector auto regressions using one year lagged value of      and                    . The controls are same 
as specified in table 4. The top tow represents dependent variables. 
 
                                                              
 
                                                                               
 
Regressions are estimated using simple OLS. Test-statistics are given in parentheses (based on robust standard 
error). All the coefficients are interpreted as elasticity. Significant coefficients are indicated with * denoting 
significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1% significance level. 
 
 IEPA IPI IEPA IPII 
Lagged IEPA 0.778*** 0.0161 0.782*** 0.0263 
 (89.33) (1.02) (89.75) (1.41) 
     
Lagged IPI 1.309*** 0.837***   
 (3.88) (77.00)   
     
Lagged IPII   0.557 0.909*** 
   (1.02) (73.37) 
     
Hbias -0.371*** -0.456*** -0.325*** -0.213*** 
 (-9.90) (-13.61) (-11.72) (-6.71) 
     
Hbias_Investor protection -1.054*** 1.764*** -0.682** 1.616*** 
 (-2.83) (14.21) (-2.58) (8.58) 
     
Stock market development/size 0.221*** 0.108*** 0.216*** 0.127*** 
 (10.40) (5.57) (9.98) (5.09) 
     
Transaction cost 2.444*** 1.872*** 2.483*** 3.120** 
 (9.95) (8.29) (9.90) (2.07) 
     
Equity market volatility -0.0345*** 0.0143 -0.0677*** -0.286*** 
 (-3.83) (0.37) (-4.64) (-5.97) 
     
Common language 0.356*** 0.0272 0.0195*** 0.0414 
 (3.13) (1.06) (4.07) (1.27) 
     
Bilateral trade 0.406*** -0.0946 0.413*** 0.0278 
 (6.93) (-0.02) (7.02) (0.41) 
     
Distance -0.0579*** -0.0325 -0.0466*** -0.0495 
 (-4.92) (-1.01) (-3.98) (-0.64) 
     
Historical return -0.0841 0.228*** -0.0875 0.171*** 
 (-1.34) (5.73) (-0.97) (3.32) 
     
Country financial risk 1.752*** 0.735*** 1.912*** 0.498* 
 (7.54) (3.45) (8.13) (1.83) 
     
Country economic risk 1.385*** 2.431*** 1.723*** 3.329*** 
 (3.68) (7.04) (4.26) (7.11) 
     
Capital market openness 1.006 7.021*** 3.338*** -0.198 
 (3.83) (6.32) (3.03) (-0.16) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.852 0.843 0.851 0.870 
Number of observations 2616 2618 2616 2618 
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Table 6: Regression with investor protection, all controls but sample excludes USA, UK 
and Japan as investor countries 
The dependent variable (wi,j,t). is the log value of country wise bilateral foreign portfolio allocation from country 
i in country j at time t. The key independent variables of interest are investor protection measures which 
includes investor profile (IPI), quality of institution (IPII) and English common law dummy (IPII). The controls 
are bilateral home bias (Hbias), Hbias_IP, stock market development/size, liquidity/transaction cost, equity 
market volatility, bilateral trade, common (pair countries) language dummy (pair countries), log distance 
between capital cities of the pair countries, three year moving average historical return, country financial risk 
(components are: foreign debt as % of GDP, exchange rate stability, foreign debt as % of total export and 
services, current account as % of exports and services and international liquidity), country economic risk 
(components are: GDP per head, Real GDP growth, inflation rate, budget balance as % of GDP, current account 
as % of GDP) and capital control. 
 
                                                  
 
Regressions with IPI and IPII as independent variables are estimated using fixed effect model and with IPIII 
(Common English law dummy) using random effect model. Test-statistics are given in parentheses (based on 
robust standard error allowing for clustering within the cross sectional units). All the coefficients are interpreted 
as elasticity. Significant coefficients are indicated with * denoting significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1% 
significance level. 
 
 IPI IPI IPII 
Hbias -0.786*** -0.847*** -0.903*** 
 (-16.10) (-26.91) (-69.04) 
    
Investor protection 4.549*** 7.572*** 0.964*** 
 (4.18) (6.82) (6.93) 
    
Hbias_Investor protection -1.505*** -0.766*** -0.0525** 
 (-3.18) (-2.64) (-2.33) 
    
Stock market development/size 0.633*** 0.625*** 0.643*** 
 (20.35) (21.78) (19.69) 
    
Transaction cost 10.08*** 10.29*** 15.24*** 
 (4.98) (5.44) (6.99) 
    
Equity market volatility -0.134*** -0.127*** -0.126*** 
 (-5.94) (-5.52) (-5.60) 
    
Common language NA NA 0.453*** 
   (3.75) 
    
Bilateral trade 0.656*** 0.546*** 1.397*** 
 (3.85) (3.30) (7.56) 
    
Distance NA NA -0.197*** 
   (-3.92) 
    
Historical return 0.0236 0.0380 -0.0659** 
 (0.70) (1.22) (-1.99) 
    
Country financial risk 1.329*** 1.543*** 1.153*** 
 (7.79) (9.18) (6.56) 
    
Country economic risk 0.723*** 0.530** 0.730** 
 (2.89) (2.15) (2.45) 
    
Capital market openness 0.276 -1.622 4.544** 
 (0.12) (-0.66) (2.03) 
Overall R
2
 0.599 0.614 0.668 
Number of observations 2586 2586 2586 
 
 
